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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper analyzes the discussion of a substitution 
account in the 1970s and how the account might 
have performed had it been agreed in 1980. The 
substitution account would have allowed central 
banks to diversify away from the dollar into the 
IMF’s Special Drawing Right (SDR), comprised 
of US dollar, Deutschmark, French franc (later 
euro), Japanese yen and British pound, through 
transactions conducted off the market. The account’s 
dollar assets could fall short of the value of its SDR 
liabilities, and hedging would have defeated the 
purpose of preventing dollar sales. In the event, 
negotiators were unable to agree on how to distribute 
the open-ended cost of covering any shortfall if the 
dollar’s depreciation were to exceed the value of any 
cumulative interest rate premium on the dollar. As 
it turned out, the substitution account would have 
encountered solvency problems had the US dollar 
return been based on US treasury bill yields, even 
if a substantial fraction of the IMF’s gold had been 
devoted to meet the shortfall at recent high prices 
for gold. However, had the US dollar return been 
based on US treasury bond yields, the substitution 
account would have been solvent even without any 
gold backing. 
INTRODUCTION
The global financial crisis of 2008 prompted calls to 
reform the international monetary system (IMS) as 
well as overhaul the supervision and regulation of 
global banking. These calls came notwithstanding 
the unexpected nature of the crisis and the surprising 
performance of the dollar during the crisis. Before the 
crisis, many had fretted that the global “imbalances” 
that emerged in the 2000s were increasing the fragility 
of the international economy, in particular through 
the massive accumulation of dollar-denominated 
assets in Asia. As the dollar depreciated and liquidity 
of the euro markets deepened, on the eve of the 
crisis Chinn and Frankel (2008) could easily foresee 
circumstances in which the dollar would yield the 
status of leading global currency to the euro.
In the end, the global financial crisis was trans-
Atlantic in nature, rather than trans-Pacific. Analyses 
that had, before the crisis, emphasized current 
account imbalances around the Pacific basin added 
gross capital flows across the Atlantic (Bernanke et 
al., 2011). Others argued that global imbalances had 
little to do with the crisis (Borio and Disytat, 2011; 
Shin, 2012). 
The crisis provided new evidence of the US dollar’s 
dominance in international finance even as it 
renewed discussion of alternatives to the dollar. 
As banks scrambled to retain dollar funding for 
their huge global dollar assets, a dollar shortage 
broke out (McGuire and von Peter, 2009; McCauley 
and McGuire, 2009). Borrowing dollars became 
expensive, whether in cash markets or in the 
forward currency markets, where the dollar is used 
on one side in over 90 percent of transactions. New 
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evidence for the stability of the dollar’s role in the 
foreign exchange market arrived from the edge of 
the euro area, where the forward exchange markets 
for the Polish and Hungarian currencies shifted from 
dollar to euro in late 2008, only to shift back (Bank 
for International Settlements [BIS], 2010). Evidently, 
the dollar’s dominance derives not only from inertia, 
but also from the reinforcement of its use elsewhere 
(network externalities). To ease the dollar shortage, 
the Federal Reserve extended dollar credit to various 
central banks, in some cases without limit. 
At the same time, the global financial crisis brought 
back into the spotlight a long-standing alternative 
to the dollar as a global reserve asset, the SDR. To 
counter a contraction in international financing 
(or liquidity) provided by financial markets, the 
US Treasury accepted the proposal of Edwin (Ted) 
Truman (2009a; 2009b) to support a one-time 
increase in the allocation of SDRs to International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) members in August 2009. 
However, the US$250 billion, or SDR 161 billion, 
increase left SDRs still only a single-digit percentage 
of global foreign exchange reserves (Obstfeld, 2011). 
More generally, the demonstration of the pervasive 
role of the dollar raised again the long-standing 
issue of the costs and benefits of the IMS’s reliance 
on a single national currency. An engineer schooled 
in the need for resilient systems with back-ups might 
see the dollar’s role as the potential single point of 
failure. Following Charles Kindleberger, Eichengreen 
(2011), James (2009), McKinnon (2012) and others 
have argued that a dollar-denominated system 
could enjoy stability as a result of US leadership. 
Others view “dollar hegemony” as a challenge to 
the virtues of pluralism. These virtues were thought 
to include collective, rather than national, control 
of global liquidity (however defined), a fair sharing 
of any rents, rather than national privileges, and 
protection against errors or self-dealing of the so-
called hegemon.
The widely read March 2009 statement of Xiaochuan 
Zhou, governor of the People’s Bank of China, 
invoked the Triffin dilemma in arguing for “an 
international reserve currency that is disconnected 
from individual nations and is able to remain stable in 
the long run, thus removing the inherent deficiencies 
caused by using credit-based national currencies” 
(Zhou, 2009), perhaps by developing the scope of 
the SDR.1 This was not the dilemma in its original 
form: the use of the dollar to finance growing world 
trade must lead to an increase in short-term US 
liabilities that at some point undermine the dollar’s 
link to gold. Instead, it was more like the generalized 
dilemma as stated by Padoa-Schioppa (2010): 
national control of global liquidity, however defined, 
would be unlikely to produce an outcome that would 
be optimal for the world. Zhou (2009) also advocated 
centralized management of reserves by the IMF 
through “an open-ended SDR-denominated fund 
based on the market practice, allowing subscription 
and redemption in the existing reserve currencies.” 
IMF (2011) showed interest. 
With central bank balance sheets swollen from the 
purchase of domestic or foreign currency bonds, 
those who seek pluralism and lesser reliance on the 
dollar are hard pressed to argue merely for further 
SDR issues. Instead, movement away from the dollar 
in official foreign exchange reserves would need 
to be accomplished by a transformation of existing 
dollar reserve holdings into holdings denominated 
in other currencies. Accomplishing this in an off-
market transaction, so as not to depress the dollar’s 
1  See United Nations (2009). The commission responsible for 
the UN report, which included Yu Yongding of the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences, did not mention the substitution account in chapter 5’s 
discussion of “international financial innovations.”
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exchange rate, was the core idea of the substitution 
account.
Policy makers active in the 1970s, when the dollar 
was weak and too many dollars seemed to be 
behind global inflation, have recalled this device for 
transforming liquid assets from the dollar to other 
currencies: the substitution account (Bergsten, 2007; 
Camdessus, 2009; Padoa-Schioppa, 2010; Wijnholds, 
2009; Palais-Royale Initiative, 2011).2 On the US 
side, participants in the late 1970s discussion of the 
proposal for a substitution account have revisited 
the issues (Bergsten, 1997; 2007; Cooper, 2009; 
Kenen, 1980, 1983, 2005, 2010a; 2010b; 2010c).3 
Another generation assembled as Angeloni et al. 
(2011: 37, 61, 70, 75) entertains the introduction of 
the substitution account in some scenarios, although 
2  At least two organizations have formed to renew debate 
on the reform of the IMS. The Reinventing Bretton Woods Committee 
has sponsored a series of events thanks to the indefatigable Marc Uzan 
(http://rbwf.org/cms/index.php). The Palais Royale Group was formed 
on the Orion’s Belt of Michel Camdessus, Alexandre Lamfallussy and 
(the late) Tomaso Padoa-Schioppa (Palais-Royale Initiative, 2011). André 
Icard, former Banque de France director of research and former deputy 
general manager, BIS, headed its secretariat. Formerly known as the 
Airlie Group after a conference centre in northern Virginia, it became the 
Palais Royale Initiative and its report is lodged on the Banque de France’s 
website on the IMS, http://global-currencies.org/smi/gb/telechar/news/
Rapport_Camdessus-integral.pdf. The report concluded: “The scope 
for supporting the orderly diversification of reserves via a mechanism 
allowing their conversion into SDR-denominated claims could be re-
examined. This objective underlay work on a substitution account in 
the 1970s. While efforts at the time faltered, alternative designs for a 
substitution account could be explored” (2011: 14). See also Boorman 
and Icard (2012). For a proposal akin to a substitution account, see 
Greenwald and Stiglitz (2010: 334–336).
3  Not all participants in the substitution account discussions of 
the late 1970s are in favour. Truman (2012: 29) describes it as a “solution 
in search of a problem.”
Farhi, Gourinchas and Rey (2011: 45) consider that 
there is “no satisfactory answer” to who should bear 
the exchange risk. 
This paper seeks to inform the renewed interest in 
the substitution account by analyzing how it would 
have handled the exchange rate risk had it been set 
up along the lines discussed in the international 
dialogue that ended in 1980. Kenen (2010a, 2010b) 
undertook such an exercise and concluded that 
the substitution account would have had to have 
been “topped up” by the United States by about 
US$475 billion to break even from 1980 to 2008. 
Nevertheless, he held that this cost would have been 
small relative to the US economy and would warrant 
adopting a similar scheme today. 
We contend that he did not do justice to the 
issues that divided policy makers in 1980 or to 
the sensitivity of outcomes to the date when the 
account is established. The issues include the related 
questions of the interest rate to be paid by the US 
Treasury on dollars placed into the account and the 
means for sharing possible shortfalls arising from a 
failure of uncovered interest parity to hold over any 
given horizon. The archival record shows that the 
IMF projected at the time that the account could 
well run substantial deficits over the long term, so 
that participants would have had to somehow make 
them good.
In what follows, we first describe the substitution 
account proposal as it developed from 1973 to 1980. 
A longer perspective is important to understand why 
the idea was ultimately rejected in 1980. Next, we 
profile the main outstanding issues, again relying not 
only on published accounts like Sobol (1979), Wallich 
(1980), Gowa (1984) and Boughton (2001) but also 
on archival sources from the IMF, the BIS and the UK 
Treasury. We then discuss the proposal in light of the 
changes over the last generation in the management 
of reserves, highlighting reserve managers’ altered 
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habitats in terms of the yield curve and credit risk. 
Finally, we undertake simulations that show how 
the substitution account would have performed on 
different assumptions about the resolution of the 
outstanding issues and different starting points. We 
then draw conclusions.
WHAT WAS THE SUBSTITUTION 
ACCOUNT?
The concept of exchanging dollar-denominated 
reserve assets for a reserve unit issued by the IMF 
or another multilateral agency had a long period of 
gestation towards what was ultimately a stillbirth. 
From the early 1960s, there was widespread concern 
over the sustainability of the Bretton Woods system 
of using national currencies as reserve assets. This 
was most closely associated with the Triffin dilemma, 
which predicted a loss of confidence in the gold value 
of the US dollar as the value of liquid claims on the 
United States in the form of dollar foreign exchange 
reserves increased. More generally, Triffin argued for 
the need to choose the rate of global reserve growth 
collectively rather than allow it to be a by-product of 
national decisions.
Very early on, many schemes shared common 
characteristics, including a neutral unit of account 
issued by a multilateral fund (either the IMF or a 
new institution embedded in the IMF) against the 
deposit of foreign exchange reserve assets.4 At first, 
US unwillingness to consider any scheme that would 
replace the dollar blocked progress, but from 1965, 
as the American balance of payments problems 
4  For example, under the British Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Reginald Maudling’s Mutual Currency Account scheme of 1962, the 
IMF would create a separate pool to which countries in surplus would 
contribute foreign exchange reserves in return for claims on the account. 
These interest-bearing assets with a gold value guarantee would form 
part of the donors’ national reserves. See Schenk (2010: 245–252) and 
Sobol (1979: 41-42).
appeared more protracted, the administration of 
President Lyndon B. Johnson embraced the reform 
discussions then underway in the Group of 10 (G10). 
With the obstacle of US reticence removed, the talks 
gained traction and culminated in a resolution that 
met half of the goal: the creation of a new reserve unit 
that could be deliberately created by IMF members, 
but not a way to replace existing foreign exchange 
reserve assets. Rather than replacing an existing stock 
of assets, the reform was aimed at collective control 
over some of the flow of future reserve creation. 
The SDR in 1967 was a triumph of ambiguity over 
clarity of purpose, a compromise driven by the need 
to meet expectations that had been built up for an 
announcement at the Rio IMF Annual Meeting in 
September 1967. Careful terminology avoided the 
label of reserve asset and the SDR was designed 
to add to rather than replace existing reserves. US 
and UK officials referred to it publicly as front-line 
reserves while French officials assigned it a lesser role 
as a new limited form of credit (with “reconstitution” 
requirements analogous to requiring repayment 
after use). Ambiguous in concept and requiring 
a super-majority of IMF votes to make further 
allocations, SDR issuance remained very limited. As 
a result, the SDR neither contributed significantly to 
international official reserves nor replaced foreign 
exchange as the primary reserve asset. Nor did it 
fulfil the hope that it might preserve the Bretton 
Woods system. In 1971, the United States withdrew 
from its pledge to convert dollars into gold, and the 
dollar began to float against other major currencies 
by early 1973. 
The evident failure of the SDR to resolve the 
weaknesses in the Bretton Woods system alongside 
the growth of an apparently persistent global 
imbalance between the United States, on the one 
hand, and Japan and West Germany, on the other, led 
to renewed proposals for reform. The advent of flexible 
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exchange rates had transformed the Triffin dilemma 
into a problem of possibly unstable demands for fiat 
reserve currencies. The prospect of a destabilizing 
rush of official reserves out of the US dollar, against 
the backdrop of resistance by the German and 
Japanese authorities to wider international use 
of their currencies, led the Committee of Twenty 
(representing the executive directors of the IMF) to 
consider a substitution account in 1973–1974. 
The plan would allow (or in some early versions 
require) official reserve holders to replace a portion 
of their foreign exchange reserves with SDRs 
issued by a special account overseen by the IMF.5 
By February 1973, the US Treasury was prepared to 
envisage a one-time conversion of some existing 
US dollar reserves into SDRs, replacing liabilities 
to sundry national creditors with a liability to an 
IMF-based substitution account. The US Treasury, 
however, remained wary of either undertaking a 
new financial obligation by guaranteeing the SDR 
value of the account or of paying better yields to the 
account than it was offering the public. If the terms 
were too generous, particularly considering the huge 
scale of possible liabilities to the account, the US 
Treasury (and Congress) would be unable to agree 
to the proposal. They thus kept an open mind on the 
need to transform US dollar reserves while pressing 
for a symmetrical global adjustment mechanism to 
discipline countries in persistent surplus. Others, 
particularly in Europe, hoped to devise a system 
that forced the US economy to reduce its deficits 
and redeem its liabilities in some form other than 
more dollar liabilities. In February 1973, the IMF’s 
US executive director, William B. Dale, dismissed 
the substitution account as an interesting academic 
5  The formal name of the Committee of Twenty was the 
Committee on Reform of the International Monetary System and 
Related Issues; it attempted to broaden the governance of the IMS 
beyond the G10.
exercise noting that “while the broad analytical 
issues were of great interest, the more fundamental 
questions lay in the obligations of debtors and 
creditors” and “unless the proponents of the various 
schemes had some practical way of dealing with the 
problem of financial obligation on the part of the 
reserve centers [i.e. the United States], little progress 
could be made.”6 Certainly without American 
support or at least acquiescence, no arrangement to 
transform US dollar reserves could go forward. 
Nevertheless, the Committee of Twenty’s final 
report in June 1974 included an illustrative proposal 
for a substitution account, leaving open the contested 
questions of interest rates payable on assets and 
liabilities, the disposition of any profit or loss and 
the terms of liquidation. In the end, these were the 
same issues that eventually scuppered the 1980 
substitution account. Lurking behind these issues 
was the European desire to require the US Treasury 
to amortize the dollar assets in the fund over time 
by exchanging them for SDRs. Europeans saw such 
settlement of dollar obligations in a medium not 
created by the United States (formerly gold, now 
SDRs) as making the IMS more symmetric and 
as exerting collective control over international 
liquidity.7 By the time the Committee of Twenty’s 
report was completed, the urgency of responding 
to the oil crisis, inflation, floating exchange rates, 
development challenges and the deficits of less-
6 IMF Archives [IMFA] Executive Board Minute [EBM] /73/19, 
February 23, 1973. Sobol (1979) states that the proposal died for lack of 
support owing to the below-market rate of return then paid on the SDR 
and a lack of consensus on adjustment obligations as between debtor 
and crKeneditor countries. 
7  See IMF (1974). Rueff (1972: 78) summarized the asymmetry 
with a simile: “If I had an agreement with my tailor that whatever money 
I pay him he returns to me the very same day as a loan, I would have no 
objection at all to ordering more suits from him.”
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developed countries pushed the complex and longer 
term topic of a substitution account down the IMF 
agenda. There was little political support for it and it 
was ignored in the proposals to reform the Articles of 
Agreement agreed in 1976. 
A depreciating dollar and negotiations for fresh 
allocations of SDRs revived the discussion of 
a substitution account at the end of 1977.8 In 
this context, the controversy over the potential 
expansionary effect of fresh allocations of SDRs on 
international liquidity prompted IMF Managing 
Director Johan Witteveen to propose in February 
1978 that developed countries (including the 
United States) might deposit an amount of dollars 
equivalent to the amount of SDRs they were 
allocated into a “substitution account” in order to 
neutralize the impact on international liquidity 
and to increase the proportion of global reserves 
denominated in SDR. The IMF would invest the 
proceeds in long-term US Treasury securities.9 The 
United States was initially non-committal, although 
the British and Belgians supported the scheme as a 
way to increase the use of the SDR.10 After months of 
deliberation, the United States rejected the proposal 
on three grounds: it would require the US Treasury 
to borrow the dollars to deposit in the account, it 
would be too small to make much of a difference to 
the distribution of global reserves and might further 
8  See Boughton (2001: 937–938), Solomon (1982: 285).
9  Telegram from W. Ryrie at IMF Washington, February 24, 
1978. The National Archives [TNA], London, T382/102; telegram from 
UK IMF Director Ryrie, to Treasury. TNA T381/130.
10  Telegram from UK Treasury to UK IMF Director Ryrie, July 5, 
1978. TNA T381/130. Prime Minister James Callaghan (April 1976–May 
1979) was an enthusiast for developing the SDR and reform of the IMS 
but his successor Margaret Thatcher (and her Financial Secretary Nigel 
Lawson), who took office while the final discussions of the account took 
place, was not.
weaken confidence in the dollar. The European 
reaction was also “remarkably negative.11 The 
Germans, French and Italians rejected Witteveen’s 
plan early on as too lenient to the Americans in terms 
of both the low interest they would pay on the US 
Treasury securities and the lack of arrangements to 
amortize the funds in the account (i.e., for the United 
States to pay off its liabilities).12 In the end, a further 
modest allocation of SDRs for the next three years 
was agreed without such an offset and Witteveen’s 
initiative was deferred for future study. 
These early iterations of a substitution account as a 
vehicle to increase the role of the SDR in the IMS 
clearly exposed the key obstacles that remained 
unresolved in 1980: 
• The importance of US enthusiasm to the 
success of any scheme, but, at the same time, 
the equivocal position of the US Treasury and 
administration over setting up a rival to the US 
dollar as a reserve currency.
• The appropriate return on SDR assets in the 
account.
• The need for the United States to take on a major 
burden of any scheme.
• The desire of the Europeans that the United 
States amortize its obligations, imparting 
symmetry to the system.
At the beginning of November 1978, the United 
States reversed its benign neglect of the dollar 
11  Telegram from Ryrie at IMF Washington, February 24, 1978, 
reporting a lunch meeting of European IMF directors with Witeveen. 
TNA T382/182.
12  Telegram from Ryrie to London, July 14, 1978. TNA T381/130. 
Paper for Kenneth Couzens end Jan 1979. Bank of England paper, March 
23,1978. TNA T382/102.
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exchange rate and took a tough set of measures that 
halted the dollar’s decline. This change in US policy 
opened an opportunity to revisit the role of the dollar 
in the IMS. It seemed that US opinion on reducing 
the role of the dollar might have changed given the 
investment of policy in its stabilization.
By December, the new IMF managing director, 
Jacques de Larosière, was taking soundings on 
a fresh and more ambitious scheme for the next 
Interim Committee of the IMF scheduled for March 
1979.13 The goal was still enhancing the SDR and 
reducing dependence on the US dollar as a reserve 
currency, but the mechanism became more elaborate 
to overcome the objections to Witteveen’s scheme 
and to target those countries that wanted to diversify 
their existing stock of reserve holdings. As reported 
by William Ryrie, the UK’s IMF executive director, 
“what was needed was a voluntary arrangement 
which would give countries which felt they had 
dollars in excess the opportunity to deposit them 
in exchange for some acceptable instrument and 
he [de Larosière] was thinking in terms of an SDR-
denominated asset issued by the Fund.”14 The IMF 
would then invest the account’s dollars in long-term 
US securities. US Treasury Under-Secretary Anthony 
Solomon had been guarded when de Larosière 
approached him informally, but was willing to 
consider the plan while de Larosière quietly sought 
further opinion from a select group of other countries. 
In order to make a more substantial contribution to 
reforming the reserves system, the total amount of 
the account would perhaps be about US$20 billion, 
13  The Interim Committee comprised ministers of member 
states and so had greater political weight and decision-making powers 
than the executive board comprised of officials.
14  Telegram from Ryrie in Washington reporting a discussion 
with de Larosière, December 13, 1978. TNA T381/130.
much greater than Witteveen’s earlier proposal for 
about half of that amount.15 
Despite these preparations, the IMF executive 
directors in February 1979 received the proposal 
with caution rather than enthusiasm, although the 
US representative, Sam Cross, pledged to keep an 
“open mind.”16 Cross’s agnostic view was partly 
a ruse to avoid raising expectations. Solomon 
privately told his British and German counterparts 
that his main concern was the potential effect of 
prolonged and public discussion of these reform 
proposals on the US dollar and urged that a group 
smaller than the IMF should take the discussions 
forward.17 Solomon’s long-term goal was to promote 
the SDR as a replacement for private rather than 
official holdings of dollars, but he conceded that a 
substitution account aimed at central banks would 
take a step toward this goal by creating new SDR-
denominated assets. German Finance Minister 
Manfred Lahnstein remained among the most 
prominent skeptics: although he “feared too much 
allure for journalists in the substitution account,” 
and also ”feared nothing would come of it,” he 
agreed to continue deliberations in a small group. 
The lukewarm response of the Interim Committee 
in March 1979 kicked the scheme into the long 
grass of further investigation by the executive board. 
The non-committal public statement of the Interim 
Committee was drafted by the British by the end 
15  DJS Hancock memorandum 26/2/79 TNA T381/130.
16  Telegram from Ryrie (Washington) to UK Treasury, February 
14, 1979. TNA T385/248.
17  Secret and personal note of discussion of Kenneth Couzens 
with Solomon and Lahnstein, February 15, 1979. TNA T385/248.
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of February, weeks before the Committee met.18 
Meanwhile, ministers of the Group of Five (G5) 
(the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, 
West Germany and France) agreed to meet secretly 
among themselves and through deputies to discuss 
the technicalities out of public earshot.
This archive-based account contradicts both 
Boughton’s (2001: 938) claim that “the most 
pronounced enthusiasm came from European 
countries itching to diversify their reserves” and 
Robert Solomon’s (1982: 286) contention that 
the enthusiasm of Anthony Solomon also added 
momentum. Some further insight is available from 
the British account of the G5 working group that 
the UK Treasury chaired.19 In June 1979, Solomon 
was reported to be warming to the proposal and the 
UK negotiator in the G5 group noted that “the US 
seemed prepared to go along with the creation of a 
substitution account” so long as the United States did 
not bear more than half of the exchange risk, eventual 
liquidation was conditional on US agreement and 
the SDR assets did not have a fixed maturity (i.e., 
the scheme was open-ended). Furthermore, the 
plan had to be presented as an enhancement of the 
SDR rather than a support for the US dollar against 
destabilizing diversification of global reserves. The 
Germans disagreed, insisting that the purpose was 
to avoid a flight from the dollar to, for example, 
the Deutschmark and they resisted bearing any 
exchange risk. The timing of the necessary legislation 
was also an obstacle, given the need to approve the 
18 Kenneth Couzens was invited by Jacques Polak to draft the 
conclusions of the Interim Committee and this was sent to the UK 
Chancellor of the Exchequer (Chair of the Interim Committee) on March 
5, 1979. TNA T385/248.
19 The following paragraph draws on “Brief for Incoming 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Geoffrey Howe,” by M. Hedley-Smith. June 
7, 1979. TNA T382/102.
European Monetary System. They also wanted the 
United States to agree to redeem some of the dollars 
in the account over time (so-called amortization). 
The French agreed with the Germans on sharing 
the exchange risk and amortization and predicted 
difficulty in getting the French parliament to enact 
appropriate legislation. They also argued that the 
success of the account would depend on a reduction 
of US balance of payments deficits since “it is no good 
taking dollars out of the system without assurance 
that they won’t be created all over again.” This was 
clearly resisted by the Americans. The Japanese 
position was “quiet.”
The British Labour government (1974–1979) sought 
to promote use of the SDR and international monetary 
reform, but Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative 
government, elected in May 1979, had other 
priorities. In June 1979, Nigel Lawson (then financial 
secretary to the Treasury) scathingly commented, “we 
should not waste valuable manpower on matters 
such as the IMF substitution account. Over the years 
I can recall no aspect of the financial scene where 
so much high-powered effort has been expended to 
so little return.”20 The British were not alone in their 
skepticism.
The Americans continued to resist bearing more 
than half of the exchange risk or committing to 
amortizing the assets. The UK representative 
described the August 3, 1979 executive board 
meeting as “fairly fractious and did not conclude 
until almost midnight.”21 He reported ”widespread 
feeling that a substitution account would not aid 
in the international adjustment process” and the 
20 Nigel Lawson to Geoffrey Howe (Chancellor of the 
Exchequer), June 13, 1979. Howe minuted “I...have reached similar 
conclusions.” TNA T382/102.
21 Telegram from Washington to UK Treasury, August 6, 1979. 
TNA 382/102.
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recommendations from the Board to the Interim 
Committee remained inconclusive. The British 
delegation was frustrated that ministers would 
not receive a more definitive steer, but there was 
no consensus on the complex set of alternative 
variations of the technical aspects, particularly 
interest payments, burden of exchange risk and the 
terms of liquidation. The IMF ministers’ meeting in 
Belgrade in October 1979 coincided with a crisis in 
market confidence in the US dollar. This was not 
the time for a bold policy departure and differences 
over the technicalities remained unresolved. By April 
1980, the proposal for a substitution account had 
been abandoned for a third time.
With respect to the 1980 iteration of the substitution 
account, Kenen (2010a) states that “the proposal was 
widely discussed at the time but was not adopted 
for two reasons: the strengthening of the dollar in 
foreign-exchange markets at the start of the 1980s 
and, more importantly, the refusal of the United 
States to take sole responsibility for maintaining the 
dollar value of the SDR-denominated claims on the 
proposed account.” While the impetus for reform 
did recede with the dollar’s recovery and the burden-
sharing of risk was an important issue, this synopsis 
understates the technical, political and institutional 
obstacles to the scheme. It is clear that there was no 
firm expectation that the United States would take 
the sole exchange rate risk, although agreement 
over the burden sharing remained elusive. The 
Europeans sought to constrain the United States to 
reduce its official liabilities as a price of transforming 
and solidifying them and, in the face of resistance, 
stiffened their position on yields and exchange-risk 
sharing. Moreover, it became clear that participating 
in the account would require national legislation in 
many cases, which would be politically contentious 
as well as time consuming. Ultimately, given the 
uncertainties over the future performance of such an 
account and plans for a monetary union in Europe 
(the European Monetary System with its European 
Currency Unit [Dammers and McCauley, 2006] was 
launched in March 1979), there was no political will 
to embark on an elaborate and possibly expensive 
scheme to retire a proportion of dollar reserves. 
So far, we have characterized the evolving proposal 
for a substitution account in political terms as a 
case of failed international financial diplomacy. 
In economic terms, the solvency or possibility 
theorem of the substitution account is one of the 
central theorems of international finance. The open 
economy version of Irving Fisher’s hypothesis holds 
that over time, currency movements offset interest 
differentials so that higher yielding currencies 
depreciate. While this hypothesis boasts a fine 
pedigree, the data over the years have treated it very 
badly. In fact, the simulations reported below show 
that US treasury bill yields over the last 30 years 
have not been high enough to offset the decline 
of the US dollar against the other SDR currencies. 
This finding is consistent with the simulations 
undertaken in 1980 by the IMF, which suggested 
the possibility of a substantial shortfall that would 
need to be met either by extra capital committed by 
members or from IMF resources.22 Since the SDR 
interest rate is based on the component treasury 
bill rates,23 the version of the substitution account in 
which the United States paid treasury bill rates on 
the account’s assets sets up a particular form of the 
test of uncovered interest parity. While most studies 
of interest parity over the past generation have used 
short-term bank rates for major currencies, earlier 
tests used government bill yields (Aliber, 1973). The 
22  Memo for Executive Board, “Substitution Account – Results 
of a Simulations Study of the Account’s Financial Balance,” April 2, 1980, 
IMFA SM/80/83.
23  See below, however, for a post-euro qualification of this 
statement.
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simulations of the substitution account reported by 
Kenen (2010a, 2010b), therefore, may be regarded as 
tests of uncovered interest parity in a multi-currency 
setting using (mostly) government bill rates.
What we have learned about uncovered interest 
parity since 1980 has uneven application to the 
SDR against the dollar. What we now know is that 
higher yielding currencies over many sample periods 
actually rise against lower yielding currencies. If this 
finding applied to the dollar/SDR, the substitution 
account would have fared well.24 On average, the 
SDR has yielded 5.17 percent in the period from 
24  Regressions over 1980 to 2000 of the dollar’s change against 
the SDR component currencies, Deutschmark, pound sterling and 
the Japanese yen, all show this tendency with significance; only the 
movement of the French franc does not (Chinn and Meredith, 2004). See 
also Clarida, Das and Pedersen, 2009. 
mid-1980 to end 2010, while the US dollar has 
yielded slightly more at 5.37 percent. (Recall that the 
dollar amounts to something approaching half of the 
valuation of the SDR, so an interest differential of 
0.2 percent means that the differential between the 
US dollar and the weighted average of euro, sterling 
and yen is more like a half of a percent.) From the 
average yield advantage, one might expect the dollar 
to have risen against the SDR over 1980–2010, but it 
did not. Perhaps periods of weak US growth, when 
the dollar yielded less than the SDR — in 1981–1982, 
1986, 1989–1993, 2001–2003 and 2007–2010 — made 
the difference (Figure 1). In any case, the average 
yield advantage of US treasury bills over SDR rates 
would have kept the substitution account in balance 
despite a slight trend towards dollar depreciation. In 
the event, as we shall see, the trend depreciation of 
the dollar went well beyond the yield cushion.
Figure 1: SDR and US Treasury Bill Yields, 1980–2010 (in percent)
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WHAT WERE THE MAJOR 
UNRESOLVED ISSUES?25
Any revival of the substitution account would 
inevitably have to deal with the unresolved issues 
25 The final form of the proposal is in the Executive Board report 
to the Interim Committee, April 15, 1980. IMFA ICMS/Doc/80/3.
of the 1980 negotiations. These include the interest 
rates on its assets and liabilities and the means to 
assure its solvency in the event of dollar weakness 
against the other currencies included in the SDR 
basket. 
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The Interest Rates on Account Assets and 
Liabilities
The substitution account would invest its dollars 
in non-marketable US treasury securities, but their 
maturity and yields remained unresolved. Interest 
payable could be related to a range of US marketable 
securities, but the British, Dutch and others also 
sought to ensure that the United States paid a 
premium to reflect the non-marketability of these 
assets (and to promote the account’s solvency).26 
The April 1980 simulations by the Fund staff showed 
that using the US three-month treasury bill rate 
could lead to deficits in the account unless additional 
capital commitments amounting to up to 20 percent 
of the value of the account (35 percent if interest was 
paid in new SDR claims rather than US dollars) were 
committed up front. The IMF staff had a very tough 
assignment. From 1964 to 1979 the US treasury bill 
rate had remained below the weighted average of the 
SDR components even as the dollar depreciated and 
would have needed to be, on average, three percent 
higher to have made up for the dollar depreciation. 
The Fund staff attributed this to the special 
circumstance of initially high confidence in the 
stability of the US dollar and unlikely-to-be repeated 
“lags in the adjustment of financial markets.” For 
their simulations, IMF staff allowed the US treasury 
bill rate to fall a more modest 0.5 percent, 1 percent 
or at most 1.5 percent short of compensating for 
a US dollar depreciation of 1 percent per annum 
against the other SDR currencies over the next 
30 years. They also factored in some cyclical and 
26 Executive Board Minutes, April 7, 1980. IMFA EBM80/62. 
While non-marketable treasury securities might be held as assets by the 
account, the discussion foresaw the possibility of transfers of claims on 
the account among holders. 
random disturbances.27 These simulations clearly 
highlighted the importance of interest rates payable 
on assets and liabilities of the account to the costs of 
sustaining it. Getting the interest rates right would 
reduce the commitment of extra capital by members 
or of IMF resources such as gold. 
Another bone of contention was the interest payable 
on SDR-denominated assets issued by the account. 
These would need to be attractive enough to 
encourage the voluntary deposit of dollars. In April 
1980, the IMF Executive Board (at the same meeting 
that dismissed the substitution account) agreed to 
narrow the SDR basket from 16 to five currencies 
(effective May 1, 1981) to match the five currencies 
used to determine the SDR interest rate (see Box 1). 
Some Europeans argued that the yield on SDR-
denominated liabilities of the substitution account 
would need to compete not only with US Treasury 
rates but also with eurodollar market rates, since 
reserve managers also invested dollars in banks 
outside the United States. Of course, higher yields 
on SDR liabilities would increase the chances that 
the earnings of the account on its dollar assets would 
not cover its SDR liabilities, for a given US dollar/
SDR exchange rate. Higher SDR yields would leave 
room for a smaller dollar depreciation against the 
SDR before the account would run into losses.
27  Memo for Executive Board, “Substitution Account – results 
of a simulations study of the Account’s financial balance,” April 2, 1980, 
IMFA SM/80/83. The amount of capital required at the outset to ensure 
that the account’s liabilities would not fall short of its assets at the end 
of 30 years in 19 of 20 cases if interest was paid in US dollars was about 
12 percent to cover interest differentials, exchange rate movements 
and cycles plus about seven percent to cover random disturbances in 
exchange rates.
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Box 1: The Substitution Account and Reserve Management Practice
The discussion of the substitution account was complicated by the ongoing shift of US dollar reserve management 
away from US treasury bills. The construction of the SDR yields out of treasury bill yields (see Box 2 on page 28) 
reflected reserve management practice of another day. Thus, while investing the dollars in the account in treasury 
bills would make for a symmetrical treatment of assets and liabilities, it would not have accorded with reserve 
management circa 1980. By then, reserve managers outside the United States had diversified considerably from US 
treasury bills.
By 1980, official reserve holdings of US dollar bank deposits, much of them outside the United States, were about 
twice the value of holdings of US treasury bills (McCauley and Fung, 2003: 42).* At the same time, official reserve 
managers had extended maturities to the point where their holdings of US treasury coupon securities were about 
equal to their holdings of US treasury bills. Eventually, medium-term treasury bonds would become the model 
holding (Genberg et al., 2005). 
This diversification influenced the debate over the yield to be paid by the US Treasury on the dollars placed in the 
account. Thus, it is not surprising (though still incoherent in the mixing of sovereign and bank risk) that there were 
suggestions that the US Treasury pay interest on dollars in the substitution account at eurodollar yields. Indeed, as 
shown in the Annex, the additional interest yield if the London Inter Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) rather than the 
treasury bill rate were paid on the dollars would have done wonders for the finances of the account, leaving it in 
deficit only for two years in the mid-1990s. This scenario is interesting because of the suggestion that eurodollar 
interest rates be used, even though it is hard to imagine the US Treasury agreeing to pay such a private sector rate. 
And it is equally unsurprising that there were suggestions that the US Treasury pay interest on the substitution 
account at treasury bond yields. The upshot is the would-be beneficiaries of the account suggested returns on the 
dollar assets of the substitution account that differed in duration or credit from the returns on the SDR liabilities — 
basically those on risk-free government bills. But this mismatch reflected contemporary dollar reserve management 
practices, that themselves can be seen as an adaptation to the pressure for income on reserve assets to offset the 
decline of the US dollar. By placing funds in the private eurodollar market rather than in strictly safe government bills, 
contemporary reserve management had changed the nature of the dollar as a reserve asset and thus complicated 
negotiations over a purely public sector arrangement.
* This is observed despite the G10 agreement not to add to eurodollar placements. See Toniolo (2005).
THE PROPOSAL TO PAY THE HIGHER OF TREASURY 
BILL OR 20-YEAR BOND YIELDS
The majority of the IMF Executive Board took 
the view that the United States should pay 
interest on the account’s assets at the higher 
rate of either the market yield on three-month 
treasury bills or longer-term (20-year) bonds, to 
reflect the non-marketability of the assets. Sam 
Cross, the US executive director, objected that 
this amounted to asking the US Treasury to pay 
a premium and insisted that the rate should be 
equivalent to the market yield on three-month 
treasury bills “or other such maturities as may be 
agreed between the Fund and the US.”28 Cross 
suggested an alternative in which the rate would 
be set in line with the market interest rate on 
US debt corresponding to the chosen maturities 
of the non-marketable securities in the account. 
Most participants vigorously objected and sought 
a floating rate, in which the interest would be 
determined each quarter at the higher of the short 
and long current market yields.
Members of the Executive Board actually disagreed 
whether the higher of three-month or 20-year 
28  See minutes of Executive Board, April 7, 1980, IMFA 
EBM/80/63 and EBM/80/63 for the discussion on this issue.
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rates amounted to a “premium.” Even if the securities 
in the substitution account were not meant to be 
marketable, the market valuation of this option is 
of interest in understanding the bargaining at the 
time.29 After all, the US Treasury could have attached 
such an option to its public issues of 20-year treasury 
bonds and received a higher price than otherwise. 
Moreover, any Treasury proposal to give such an 
option to foreign official holders of dollars but not 
to domestic investors would have been difficult to 
defend domestically. 
In the event, the seemingly more innocent proposal 
to pay a floating rate corresponding to the 20-year 
bond yield would have been more expensive to 
the US Treasury than the ex post cost of adding the 
higher of the three-month yield as an option. Put 
differently, with hindsight, basing the Treasury’s 
dollar interest payments to the substitution account 
on the 20-year bond yield would have done wonders 
for the solvency of the scheme, while paying the 
three-month bill rate on the few occasions when 
that would have been higher would have had little 
incremental effect on its solvency.
EX ANTE VALUE OF THE OPTION AND EX POST VALUE 
OF THE OPTION
The technology to evaluate the cost of the option 
of a floating rate set at the maximum of the three-
month treasury bill rate and the 20-year bond rate 
was just becoming available at the time of these 
discussions. The Vasicek term structure model (1977), 
essentially conceiving of the short-term interest rate 
movements as Brownian motion, had been around 
29  The question of the market value might also have become 
significant in the event of liquidation. In that event, the US Treasury 
securities might have been redeemed at face value (in the case of 
undated securities) or “market value” (if there was a range of maturities). 
See page 18 of April 15 version of IMFA ICMS/80/3.
for several years.30 Technology has since moved on 
and today, so-called yield curve options are valued 
using other characterizations of the evolution of 
interest rates. We have seen no record of the IMF 
or the US Treasury or anyone else in the discussion 
attempting to price this option. Presumably the 
US Treasury could have gained access to the latest 
technology through the primary dealers of the time, 
including Salomon Brothers.
Our approach below is to consider the ex post value 
of the option that was discussed in 1980. At the time 
of Volcker’s disinflation, with treasury bill rates well 
into the teens, yield curve inversion — short-term 
yields above long-term yields — was the order of the 
day (Figure 2). One might guess that the value of this 
option was overstated then. 
30  Given the high level of interest rates at the time, its failure to 
exclude zero or negative interest rates was not such a practical problem.
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Figure 2: US Treasury Bill and Bond Yields (in percent)
Figure 2 
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Note: Due to data break from January 1987 through September 1993, the 10-year bond yield is used instead. 
Source: Federal Reserve Economic Data.  
 
	  
	   	  
Note: Due to data break from January 1987 through September 1993, the 10-year bond yield is used instead.
Source: Federal Reserve Economic Data. 
A FLOATING RATE BOND BASED ON LONG-TERM 
YIELDS: A JAPANESE EXAMPLE
To our knowledge, the world had never seen a 
competitively auctioned floating rate security paying 
interest based on long-term yields in 1980. So the 
countries proposing such a servicing scheme for 
the dollars in the substitution account had, at best, 
a back-of-the envelope idea of the value of such a 
proposal. 
The Japanese Ministry of Finance (MoF) introduced 
a 15-year bond in 2000, with a coupon, payable 
every half year, set equal to half the average 10-
year Japanese government bond auction yield over 
the prior six months less an issue-specific number 
of basis points. The absolute value of this spread 
ranged from 81 basis points in the first auction, to a 
peak of over 100 basis points in 2005, to 40–50 basis 
points in 2007.31 In the eight years from June 2000 
through June 2008, the absolute value of this spread 
31  From mid-2007, market pricing of these floating rate bonds 
fell below their “theoretical” values, by as much as 10 percent in late 2008, 
and the MoF cancelled issuance for the balance of the 2008-2009 fiscal 
year. See McCauley and Ueda (2009).
averaged 76 basis points, 60 percent of the average 
spread between the 10-year bond and six-month bill 
of 127 basis points (Figure 3). In the section “Account 
Pays US Treasury Bond Rate” on page 25, we assess 
how a similarly priced instrument based on the US 
Treasury bond would have affected the account’s 
position over the 1980–2010 period. 
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Figure 3: Japanese Government 10-year Bond Yield and Spread on Floating Rate Bonds (in percent)
Figure 3 
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Note: Absolute value of spread is plotted; spread was uniformly negative. When the 10-year bond yield over the previous period fell 
below the absolute value of the spread, the floating rate note paid a zero coupon. 
Source: Japanese MoF. 
 
	  
	   	  
Note: Absolute value of spread is plotted; spread was uniformly negative. When the 10-year bond yield over the previous period fell below the 
absolute value of the spread, the floating rate note paid a zero coupon.
Source: Japanese MoF.
Even from the pricing in low-yield yen, it is evident 
that the proposal for the US Treasury to pay a floating 
rate based on the 20-year bond without any such 
spread was extremely favourable to the US creditors. 
Their view at the time, however, was that a premium 
was due them owing to the non-marketability of 
the treasury securities to be held by the substitution 
account (although there might be agreed transfers 
among participants).
How to Meet any Shortfall of Dollar Returns 
below SDR Returns
Technical differences in the proposals arose from 
domestic political constraints on participants 
and from differences in the desired international 
adjustment process. If the US dollar were to 
depreciate against the SDR, and this was not fully 
compensated for by higher US interest rates, the 
financial balance of the account would quickly 
deteriorate. As noted above, the IMF staff ran a series 
of simulations for the account in late 1979 and early 
1980 based on historical and hypothetical future 
interest and exchange rates, all of which showed 
that liabilities were likely to exceed assets over the 
medium and longer term since depreciation of the 
dollar was expected to exceed interest differentials.32 
The viability of the account therefore depended 
on the United States following economic policies 
conducive to a strong dollar, but if this was the 
case then there was less incentive to replace the 
dollar as a reserve asset. Thus, in January 1980, 
Robert J. Whitelaw (Australia) noted “Ultimately, the 
substitution account could be effectively guaranteed 
only if the US Government followed economic 
policies that tended to maintain the value of the 
dollar.”33 Europeans worried that, with a substantial 
share of their dollar liabilities immobilized in the 
account, the United States might actually feel 
less pressure to adjust its balance of payments. 
Could the US Treasury be induced to promise to 
maintain the dollar’s SDR value to sustain solvency 
32 Memo for Executive Board, “Substitution Account: results of a 
simulations study of the Account’s financial balance,” April 2, 1980, IMFA 
SM/80/83.
33 This view was echoed by Lamberto Dini (Italy) representing 
Greece, Malta and Portugal; and Francisco Garces (Chile) representing a 
range of South American members. IMFA Executive Board Seminar 80/2, 
January 7, 1980.
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of the account? In Cooper’s (2009: 4) phrase, this 
“would be a show-stopper for the United States, 
since no Congress would provide an unconditional 
guarantee of value for assets, that, though issued by 
the US government, were issued in US dollars and 
voluntarily acquired by foreign parties.”34 If the US 
Treasury had to bear all the risk, it might as well, as 
suggested by Governor Henry Wallich of the Federal 
Reserve Board, issue SDR-denominated liabilities 
itself rather than going through the complexities of 
a substitution account (Solomon 1982: 289).35 If the 
United States was unwilling, would the claimants 
on the substitution account be prepared to bear the 
risk in order to restore some stability to the IMS? If 
so, unless the account solved a prisoners’ dilemma 
among dollar holders, they might as well continue 
to hold the dollars themselves and save the bother 
of the account. Somehow the risk had to be shared, 
and the United States took a firm position that other 
participants would have to shoulder at least half of 
the burden of exchange risk.
One politically expedient way would be to use the 
IMF’s resources, which in a certain sense would 
share any losses among the participants without 
explicitly burdening any party. Would Europeans 
and less developed countries agree that IMF gold 
should be used to maintain the dollar’s SDR value? 
To some Europeans, such an approach would allow 
the United States a free hand to adopt policies that 
would weaken the dollar since losses would be met 
by the IMF gold. For less developed countries, using 
the IMF’s gold to prop up an account that would 
benefit mainly rich participating countries (i.e., 
34  Although this is what the United Kingdom did to try to 
“retire” sterling reserves in the 1960s (Schenk, 2010).
35 In the event, after November 1978 the United States sold 
“Carter bonds” denominated in Deutschmark and Swiss franc (but not 
sterling) in an (ultimately profitable) effort to prop up the US dollar.
those with large dollar reserves) would contradict 
the agreement reached in 1976 to use the IMF’s gold 
to create a trust fund for the poorest members. For 
these reasons, many of the parties involved were 
convinced that, to ensure equity and discipline on 
US policy, the United States had to bear part of the 
burden of any losses in the account arising from 
valuation or interest rate changes.
SHARING RULES
The distribution of any burden between depositors, 
the United States and the IMF was highly 
contentious. The IMF staff simulation of the 
account’s performance over 30 years allowed the 
dollar’s downward trend to continue and examined 
the consequences of the interest rate differentials in 
favour of the dollar not affording a sufficient offset.36 
The discussion tended to consider the flow problem 
of balancing interest payments separately from 
possible currency valuation losses. The valuation 
losses would only need to be realized if the account 
were liquidated and there were ongoing hopes 
among the Germans, for example, that the United 
States could be convinced to amortize the account 
over time by buying back the dollars using its own 
foreign reserves. Most discussion focussed on the 
flow problem and members sought a solution 
whereby the United States would bear at least half 
of the shortfall of interest income from the account’s 
dollar assets in relation to required interest payment 
on SDR liabilities. The rest of the burden could be 
borne by depositors themselves or by IMF resources, 
particularly by latent profits on gold holdings, 
although the US Treasury hoped that any shortfall 
of interest earned over interest paid might be met 
36  Memo for Executive Board, “Substitution Account: results of a 
simulations study of the Account’s financial balance,” April 2, 1980, IMFA 
SM/80/83.
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through the IMF merely issuing more SDR claims.37 
However, Europeans worried that, if the United 
States bore no share of potential losses, US policy 
making could face perverse incentives (i.e., moral 
hazard). This aspect of the account was complicated 
by the uncertain nature of how the account would 
perform. At the time of the discussions, the US dollar 
was weakening, which suggested that there might 
be substantial losses to be met.
One set of solutions required all participants 
(including the United States) to commit to 
contributing a maximum amount of “callable capital,” 
although the distribution of burden between the 
United States and others was never agreed. In 
addition, there was no consensus over whether 
these contributions should be called only after 
profits from IMF gold sales had been exhausted. An 
alternative required a decision about liquidation or 
continuation to be made once the gold profits were 
exhausted. Only in the event of a majority vote to 
continue the account would further capital be called. 
If there was no agreement to make contributions, 
then the account would be liquidated and the losses 
distributed among participants. The extent of burden 
on participants during the lifetime of the account (for 
both the United States and others) clearly depended 
on whether and how the IMF’s gold reserves could 
be devoted to ensuring that the account remained 
solvent on an ongoing basis.
PROFITS ON GOLD SALES  
The amount of gold that would need to be pledged 
to support the account depended on assumptions 
of the relative dollar price of gold and the dollar 
exchange rate. At the time that the plan was being 
discussed, the rise in the dollar price of gold had far 
exceeded the declining value of the US dollar, which 
37 Minutes of meeting at UK Treasury with German, French, 
Japanese Treasury representatives, November 30, 1979. TNA T382/102.
meant that only a proportion of the account’s value 
in gold would be necessary to insure against any 
shortfall. The early simulations undertaken by IMF 
staff at the end of 1979 led them to suggest that one-
third of the Fund’s remaining gold supply (about 
32 million ounces) would be required to cover the 
potential risk of liabilities exceeding assets if the 
account amounted to a total of SDR 50 billion.38 
This would cover a potential 10 percent fall in the 
dollar vis-à-vis the SDR plus a further five percent 
of interest rate shortfall. The staff added a further 
five percent cushion to arrive at an amount of gold 
equivalent to about 20 percent of the size of the 
substitution account. As background, from 1976 the 
IMF had agreed to a program to sell about one-third 
of its gold (then 50 million ounces) as part of the 
collective resolution to reduce the role of gold in the 
IMS under Article V. To accomplish the divestment, 
half was sold at market prices and the profits were 
vested in a trust fund for developing economies.39 
With this precedent, the disposition of the IMF’s 
remaining gold reserves was highly contentious 
(developing countries wanting gold for development 
and European members wanting the gold sold back 
to members at historic values well below the market 
price40), and an 85 percent majority was required to 
approve further gold sales. By April 1980, the IMF 
staff estimated that only 20–25 million ounces of 
38 IMFA SM/79/294. Discussed at Executive Board Seminar 80/2, 
January 7, 1980. According to Boughton (2001: 941), Managing Director 
de Larosière mooted a gold backing for the SDR 50 billion substitution 
account ranging from 23 to 32 million ounces.   
39 The trust fund was terminated in April 1981 and its resources 
transferred to the Supplementary Financing Facility Subsidy Account.
40 So-called restitution involved the sale of the IMF’s gold stock 
to those who were member countries as of April 1978 at the former 
official price of SDR 35 per ounce, in proportion to their quotas as of that 
date. It was clearly of benefit to US, UK and European members.
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gold would need to be committed if the account 
were to have an initial size of SDR 50 billion. 41 
This new estimate brought the commitment to the 
substitution account into line with the volume of 
gold that had recently been sold to the benefit of the 
developing countries. 
There were three proposals: One was that part of the 
IMF’s gold would be sold when needed at market 
prices so that the profit from any price over SDR 35 
per ounce could bring the assets of the account back 
into line with its liabilities. This proposal directly 
paralleled how IMF gold was used to support less 
developed countries in 1976. Alternatively, a similar 
share of the IMF’s gold could be transferred directly 
to the substitution account’s balance sheet and either 
sold immediately or retained until it was needed. A 
third alternative (if the transfer of gold proved illegal 
under the IMF Articles) was discussed outside the 
IMF by Treasury representatives from the United 
Kingdom, the United States, Germany, France and 
Japan in November 1979; the IMF gold could be sold 
to member countries along the rules of restitution 
(i.e., at US$35/oz) and the members would sell this 
gold back to the IMF.42
A wide range of members strongly resisted the 
commitment of the IMF’s gold resources to the 
substitution account, since the benefits would not 
be distributed equitably. Joaquin Muns (Spain) 
and Lamberto Dini (Italy) stressed that this was a 
potentially illegal use of the Fund’s gold, which was 
41 Minutes of the Interim Committee of the Board of Governors 
on the International Monetary System, April 25, 1980. IMFA ICMS/
Meeting 14 (1980). Gowa (1984) cites this range as well.
42 Minutes of meeting at UK Treasury, November 30, 1979. TNA 
T382/102.
committed to equitable treatment of all members.43 
As the influential Brazilian Director Alexandre Kafka 
put it, “the Fund’s gold was in the last analysis owned 
by individual countries but would be used only to help 
the participants in the substitution account.”44 Muns 
and Jacques de Groote (Belgium) also expressed 
concern that giving the account a “gold backing” 
might resurrect the role of gold in the IMS, which 
would reverse the recent decision to reduce that 
role. Conversely, Cross (United States) and Gerhard 
Laske (West Germany) favoured the transfer of gold 
to the account, or even its immediate sale to provide 
liquid and interest-earning assets and to avoid the 
risk that the gold price would fall in the future.45 
Cross stressed that all countries would benefit 
from a stronger IMS so the equitable treatment 
constraint didn’t arise, but C. D. Deshmukh (India) 
and Jahangir Amuzegar (Iran) expressed skepticism. 
At the Executive Board seminar on the use of gold 
in the account in early January 1980, those executive 
directors rejecting the use of gold or expressing 
severe reservations accounted for just under 30 
percent of the votes in the IMF, which did not bode 
well for achieving an 85 percent approval. Without 
the IMF’s gold as backstop, participants would find 
it difficult to agree on a distribution of the burden 
among themselves and then to sell the agreement to 
their national parliaments.
43 Statement by Mr. Muns on the Use of Part of the Fund’s Gold 
in Support of the Substitution Account, IMFA EBM 80/38 March 7, 1980. 
Circulated in advance on March 6, 1980 as 80/60.
44 IMFA Executive Board Seminar 80/1, January 7, 1980. Kafka 
represented Brazil and eight other South and Central American members 
with 3.19 percent of IMF votes.
45 IMFA Executive Board Seminar 80/2, January 7, 1980.
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LIQUIDATION
Since any losses on the account would not be realized 
unless the account was liquidated, the timing and 
mechanism for liquidation was also highly contested. 
There was clearly an understanding that the balance 
of assets and liabilities would be monitored on an 
annual basis and topped up, perhaps through gold 
sales or earmarked gold profits in the first instance. 
If “at any time” liabilities exceeded assets plus the 
hypothecated value of the reserved gold profits, 
then consideration of either calling up further 
contributions or liquidation would begin. If the deficit 
rose beyond the value of assets plus gold profits plus 
callable capital, then the account would immediately 
be liquidated. This has important implications for 
the simulations since there are prolonged periods 
in which the account would have been in sustained 
deficit (up to half of the time), which brings 
into question its viability even if the losses were 
hypothetically turned around in the longer term. 
SIMULATIONS OF THE 
SUBSTITUTION ACCOUNT 
PERFORMANCE
We first present our baseline scenario, finding that the 
substitution account would have been in recurrent 
difficulty. Then we consider whether a different 
starting time — which was never explicitly discussed 
— would have helped and find that 1980 would 
have been among the best times to start from the 
standpoint of the solvency of the account. Then we 
consider the variations that were discussed and find 
that the flow question of the interest rate payable by 
the US Treasury would have made a huge difference 
while the stock question of a larger commitment of 
gold would not have made much difference. 
Each scenario assumes reinvestment of interest 
earnings. In other words, the rise in both assets 
and liabilities reflects total returns, including both 
cumulative interest and currency valuation effects. 
The exchange-rate revaluations are limited to the 
asset side, since the simulations are reported in SDR 
terms. 
Baseline Scenario
Our baseline simulation assumes that the account 
amounted to the proposed SDR 50 million, that it 
began in mid-1980 (when the US dollar was in a 
trough against major currencies) and that the potential 
profit from sales of the proposed 25 million ounces 
of IMF gold was allocated to support the account. 
With hindsight, even this favourable combination 
was a recipe for trouble. Our simulation differs from 
that of Kenen by sticking more closely to the original 
proposal whereby the deficits would be offset by IMF 
gold rather than Kenen’s annual “topping up” by the 
United States to keep the account in balance.
This simulation shows steady growth in liabilities but 
an unsteady balance between these and assets (see 
Table 1). The liability of SDR 50 billion would have 
cumulated to a liability of SDR 262 billion by 2010. 
Compounded at treasury bill yields, dollar assets 
equivalent to SDR 227 billion would have fallen short 
of liabilities by SDR 35 billion or 14 percent. This is 
a bit more optimistic than the IMF’s projections at 
the time, which suggested a possible 20 percent 
shortfall after 30 years, if dollar interest accrued at the 
three-month treasury bill rate. Importantly for the 
prospects of a sustainable account, deficits recurred. 
In particular, the account would have needed the 
support of gold as early as the Plaza Accord era in 
1987, throughout the 1990s and again for the years 
after the dollar’s peak in early 2002. 
Applying the IMF’s gold reserves would only have 
made a difference for a while. On-balance sheet 
profits on gold of as much as SDR 20 billion from 
25 million ounces would have sufficed to fill the gap 
between assets and liabilities in the late 1980s and 
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late 1990s. However, they would have fallen short 
in most of the 1990s and all of the years since 2002. 
This would have prompted liquidation discussions in 
the 1990s, requiring the calling up of contributions 
from participants. Remarkably, even the historically 
high price of gold in the last few years would not 
have restored balance.
Table 1: Baseline Scenario — Start July 1980, Pay Treasury Bill Rate,  
25 million ounces of gold (in billions of SDRs)
End-year SDR yield*
3m US 
T-bill 
yield*
Accumulated 
US$ assets
Accumulated 
SDR liabilities US$/SDR
Surplus or deficit
w/o gold
Gold price
w/ 25 m oz gold
In SDR % of assets In SDR
% of 
assets
1980 8.8 15.6 54.3 52.4 1.28 1.9 3.4 590 12.5 23.1
1981 14.7 11.3 69.5 58.9 1.16 10.6 15.2 400 18.3 26.3
1982 9.2 8.2 82.5 66.9 1.10 15.5 18.8 448 24.8 30.1
1983 8.9 9.4 95.0 73.2 1.05 21.9 23.0 382 30.1 31.7
1984 8.8 8.3 112.6 80.2 0.98 32.4 28.8 309 39.4 35.0
1985 7.8 7.3 108.9 87.1 1.10 21.8 20.0 327 28.4 26.1
1986 6.2 5.7 104.5 93.3 1.22 11.1 10.7 391 18.3 17.5
1987 6.1 6.0 95.8 99.1 1.42 -3.4 -3.5 487 4.3 4.5
1988 7.4 8.4 107.9 105.3 1.35 2.5 2.4 410 9.3 8.6
1989 9.1 7.9 120.5 114.2 1.31 6.3 5.3 401 13.1 10.9
1990 9.3 7.0 120.7 125.3 1.42 -4.6 -3.8 392 1.5 1.2
1991 7.6 4.2 127.7 136.2 1.43 -8.5 -6.6 353 -3.2 -2.5
1992 5.8 3.3 138.0 145.8 1.38 -7.8 -5.6 333 -2.6 -1.9
1993 4.2 3.1 142.6 153.5 1.37 -10.8 -7.6 391 -4.6 -3.2
1994 4.8 5.7 139.7 160.1 1.46 -20.4 -14.6 383 -14.7 -10.5
1995 4.3 5.3 145.3 167.9 1.49 -22.6 -15.5 387 -16.9 -11.7
1996 3.9 5.0 158.5 174.9 1.44 -16.4 -10.4 370 -10.9 -6.9
1997 4.4 5.3 177.9 182.1 1.35 -4.2 -2.4 289 0.3 0.2
1998 3.8 4.5 179.6 190.2 1.41 -10.6 -5.9 288 -6.4 -3.6
1999 3.8 5.4 193.1 197.0 1.37 -3.9 -2.0 291 0.6 0.3
2000 4.9 6.0 215.9 205.6 1.30 10.3 4.8 273 14.7 6.8
2001 2.4 1.7 233.6 214.2 1.26 19.4 8.3 277 24.0 10.3
2002 2.2 1.2 219.8 219.3 1.36 0.5 0.2 343 6.0 2.7
2003 1.6 0.9 203.2 223.3 1.49 -20.1 -9.9 417 -13.9 -6.8
2004 2.2 2.2 196.8 227.2 1.55 -30.3 -15.4 438 -24.1 -12.3
2005 3.0 4.0 220.2 232.8 1.43 -12.6 -5.7 513 -4.5 -2.0
2006 4.1 5.0 219.3 241.0 1.50 -21.7 -9.9 635 -12.1 -5.5
2007 3.7 3.0 219.0 251.4 1.58 -32.4 -14.8 836 -20.1 -9.2
2008 1.4 0.0 228.9 259.5 1.54 -30.7 -13.4 862 -17.6 -7.7
2009 0.3 0.0 225.2 261.3 1.57 -36.2 -16.1 1096 -19.6 -8.7
2010 0.4 0.1 229.5 262.0 1.54 -32.6 -14.2 1418 -10.4 -4.5
* Bond equivalent yield basis.
Sources: IMF; authors’ estimates.
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As a visual summary of this baseline result, the top 
panel of Figure 4 shows the assets and liabilities of 
the account under this scenario, as well as the gold 
profits at current market prices. The bottom panel 
shows the deficit as a percent of assets, with and 
without the profits from the gold.
Figure 4: Substitution Account’s Solvency — Baseline Scenario (in billions of SDRs)
Figure 4 
Substituti n Account’s Solvency: Baseline Scenari  
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Sources: IMF; authors’ estimates. 
 
	  
	   	  
Sources: IMF; authors’ estimates.
As noted, this result suggests that over long 
periods the yield premium on US dollars did not 
compensate for the dollar’s trend depreciation. 
One possible reason is that US treasury bills offer a 
particularly low yield owing to their status as one of 
the world’s most liquid securities. The substitution 
account would then suffer from the compounding 
of government bill rates if the US Treasury pays 
particularly low rates on its bills. Is it possible that the 
substitution account would have retained a balance 
between assets and liabilities had the dollar returns 
been based on eurodollar deposit rates rather than 
treasury bill rates? Figure 5 and Table 2 suggest that 
there is something to this supposition. The Treasury-
eurodollar (“Ted”) spread is wider for the US dollar 
than for the other SDR currencies. The table in the 
Annex shows that, if the substitution account’s dollar 
assets yielded US dollar LIBOR rather than treasury 
bill rates, then the account would have performed 
in a satisfactory fashion even without any resort to 
gold. In particular, the account would have had only 
two years, 1994–1995, when US dollar assets would 
have fallen below SDR liabilities. Then, as recently, 
however, “LIBOR would be disadvantageous to 
[US] Treasury as it would subject the government’s 
financing costs to bank funding risks” (Treasury 
Borrowing Advisory Committee, 2012). This was 
never a likely scenario.
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Figure 5: Treasury Bill-eurocurrency Spreads (in basis points)
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	   	  
	   	  
Graph 5 
Treasury bill-eurocurrency spread in SDR currencies 
In basis points 
 
Sources: Bloomberg; Datastream. 
 Source: Bloomberg; Datastream.
Table 2: Treasury-eurocurrency Spreads (in basis points)
Periods Average Spreads
USD 1986–2010 65.54
EUR (France) 1989–2010 17.07
EUR (Germany) 1993–2010 28.95
GBP 1986–2010 44.90
JPY 1993–2010 15.31
Source: Bloomberg; Datastream.
Alternative Start Date
The marked cycling of the value of the US dollar 
since the substitution account was proposed means 
that the choice of starting point can make a big 
difference to the outcome. Indeed, the substitution 
account appeals precisely when the US dollar is 
weak and there are doubts about the sustainability 
of its role as a reserve asset. One might almost say 
that when officials come around to discussing such 
an account, the dollar has reached its trough (1974, 
1980, 2011?). The exception seems to be the 1995 
trough of the dollar, when there was no substantive 
support for a substitution account.46
The cycles of the dollar against the SDR correspond 
to those of the dollar in general, as measured by 
either the Federal Reserve or the BIS nominal 
exchange rate indices (Figure 6). Run the data from 
1980 or 1995, and the substitution account had an 
outside chance to produce satisfactory results. Run 
the analysis of the substitution account from near 
the dollar peaks of 1985 or 2002, and the account will 
be in chronic trouble. 
46  Although a substitution account did form part of the 
deliberations at a seminar of academics, Treasury and central bank 
officials held at the IMF in March 1996; see Mussa, Broughton and Isard 
(1996). This conference responded to calls from the Group of Seven and 
Interim Committee meetings of 1995 for the IMF to review the role and 
functions of the SDR.
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Figure 6: The US Dollar/SDR Rate and the US Dollar Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (end-of-period)
Figure 6  
The US Dollar/SDR Rate and the US Dollar Nominal Effective Exchange Rate 
End-of-period 
 
1 2005 = 100.  
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; IMF; BIS. 
 
	  
	   	  
1 2005 = 100.
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; IMF; BIS.
Thus, the choice by Kenen (2010a) of 1980 and 
1995 as starting points produce unrepresentatively 
favourable results. He notes that his historical 
simulation “begins in 1980, chosen in part because 
that was the year in which the proposal for a 
Substitution Account was not in fact adopted.” Given 
that the negotiations continued well into 1980, it is 
not likely that a substitution account could have 
been implemented before the end of that year, in 
view of the time required to gather “widespread” 
participation and political approval. We argue that 
1981 is historically a more realistic starting point if 
all the obstacles discussed above could have been 
overcome. 
In the event, even this subtle difference in timing 
would have had important implications for the 
account’s performance. Figure 7 shows how much 
worse the account’s solvency would have proved 
had it started in mid-1981. This finding underscores 
the importance of the initial conditions and, more 
generally, the risks posed by exchange rates to the 
whole venture. In this simulation, the account would 
have been insolvent within five years and would not 
have recovered, even after taking substantial gold 
profits into account.
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Figure 7: Account’s Solvency — Start mid-1981; Pay Treasury Bills Rate (in billions of SDRs)
Figure 7 
Account’s Solvency: Start mid-1981; Pay Treasury Bills Rate 
In billions of SDRs 
 
Sources: IMF; authors’ estimates. 
 
 
  
Sources: IMF; authors’ estimates.
Account Pays US Treasury Bond Rate
If gold, in the amounts that might have been agreed, 
could not keep the balance of the account, perhaps 
a more favourable outcome was possible if the US 
Treasury paid one of the alternative yields on the 
account’s US dollar assets. In principle, compounding 
using a bond yield adds a term premium. In practice, 
any adaptive element in the inflation expectations 
embedded in bond yields would have boosted 
yields in a period of declining trend inflation. 
Table 3 shows that if the United States had 
somehow been convinced to pay interest on its 
liabilities in the substitution account at the 20-year 
bond rate, as was suggested by some protagonists at 
the time, the account would have performed much 
more satisfactorily and there would have been a 
considerable surplus.
Indeed, the margin of solvency would have been 
wide enough to permit the 20-year yield to have been 
shaved in a manner parallel to that of the Japanese 
government floating-rate bond as described above. 
A fortiori, the investment of dollars in fixed-rate 
treasury bonds in 1980 or 1981, then carrying double-
digit yields, as proposed by US Executive Director 
Cross, would have done wonders. 
This finding helps put in new perspective the shift by 
reserve managers toward longer-dated US Treasury 
obligations in the years since 1980 (McCauley and 
Rigaudy, 2011). The largest reserve managers tend 
to finance (or “sterilize”) their own reserve holdings 
with short-term, domestic currency obligations 
(somewhat akin to the short-term yields on euro, 
yen and sterling embodied in SDR returns). By 
receiving medium- or long-term yields on their US 
dollar holdings, they have been better able to offset 
the decline of the US dollar’s exchange rate on the 
total returns on their foreign exchange reserves.  
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Table 3: Scenario One — Start July 1980, Pay 20-year Bond Yield, 25 Million Ounces of Gold (in billions of SDRs)
End-
year
SDR 
yield*
20-Y US 
bond 
yield*,** 
Accumulated 
USD assets
Accumulated 
SDR 
liabilities
USD/ 
SDR
Surplus or deficit
w/o gold
Gold price
w/ 25 m oz gold
In SDR % of assets In SDR % of assets
1980 8.8 13.1 54.8 52.4 1.28 2.4 4.4 590 13.1 23.9
1981 14.7 14.4 69.0 58.9 1.16 10.1 14.7 400 17.9 25.9
1982 9.2 11.1 83.7 66.9 1.10 16.7 20.0 448 26.0 31.1
1983 8.9 12.6 98.8 73.2 1.05 25.6 26.0 382 33.9 34.3
1984 8.8 12.2 120.2 80.2 0.98 40.0 33.3 309 47.0 39.1
1985 7.8 10.1 120.4 87.1 1.10 33.3 27.7 327 39.9 33.1
1986 6.2 7.5 117.7 93.3 1.22 24.4 20.7 391 31.5 26.8
1987 6.1 9.5 110.1 99.1 1.42 10.9 9.9 487 18.6 16.9
1988 7.4 9.3 127.1 105.3 1.35 21.7 17.1 410 28.5 22.4
1989 9.1 8.2 142.3 114.2 1.31 28.2 19.8 401 34.9 24.5
1990 9.3 8.7 143.3 125.3 1.42 18.1 12.6 392 24.1 16.8
1991 7.6 7.6 154.9 136.2 1.43 18.8 12.1 353 24.1 15.5
1992 5.8 6.9 173.4 145.8 1.38 27.6 15.9 333 32.8 18.9
1993 4.2 6.6 185.6 153.5 1.37 32.1 17.3 391 38.4 20.7
1994 4.8 8.3 188.0 160.1 1.46 27.9 14.9 383 33.6 17.9
1995 4.3 6.3 198.7 167.9 1.49 30.8 15.5 387 36.4 18.3
1996 3.9 6.9 220.3 174.9 1.44 45.4 20.6 370 50.9 23.1
1997 4.4 6.3 251.6 182.1 1.35 69.5 27.6 289 73.9 29.4
1998 3.8 5.5 255.8 190.2 1.41 65.7 25.7 288 69.9 27.3
1999 3.8 6.9 279.1 197.0 1.37 82.1 29.4 291 86.5 31.0
2000 4.9 5.8 313.8 205.6 1.30 108.2 34.5 273 112.5 35.9
2001 2.4 5.9 344.5 214.2 1.26 130.3 37.8 277 135.0 39.2
2002 2.2 5.1 337.0 219.3 1.36 117.8 34.9 343 123.2 36.6
2003 1.6 5.2 324.0 223.3 1.49 100.7 31.1 417 106.8 33.0
2004 2.2 5.0 326.4 227.2 1.55 99.2 30.4 438 105.4 32.3
2005 3.0 4.9 371.9 232.8 1.43 139.1 37.4 513 147.2 39.6
2006 4.1 4.9 371.7 241.0 1.50 130.6 35.1 635 140.3 37.7
2007 3.7 4.7 372.1 251.4 1.58 120.6 32.4 836 133.0 35.7
2008 1.4 3.3 399.6 259.5 1.54 140.1 35.1 862 153.2 38.3
2009 0.3 4.5 408.6 261.3 1.57 147.2 36.0 1096 163.8 40.1
2010 0.4 4.3 433.6 262.0 1.54 171.5 39.6 1418 193.7 44.7
* Bond equivalent yield basis. 
** From January 1987 through September 1993, the 10-year bond yield is used to fill the break in the time series of the 20-year bond yield. 
Sources: IMF; authors’ estimates.
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Figure 8: Substitution Account’s Solvency — Start 1980; Pay Treasury Bond Yield (in billions of SDRs)
Figure 8 
S bstitution Account’s Solvency: Start 1980; Pay Treasury Bond Yield 
In billions of SDRs 
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Sources: IMF; authors’ estimates. 
 
	  
	   	  
Sources: IMF; authors’ estimates.
More Gold?
Rather than relying on higher yields on dollar 
assets, it is possible that the shortfall in Table 1 
could have been offset by committing more of the 
IMF’s gold to the account. The greatest amount of 
gold proposed to be committed to the account was 
the 32 million ounces that de Larosière pitched in 
January 1980 (Boughton, 2001: 941). As noted above, 
even the subsequent commitment of 25 million was 
highly controversial, but the larger amount would 
have added the profits on another seven million 
ounces to the account. Even with profits of another 
SDR 6 billion in recent years, the scenario in 
Table 1 based on US treasury bill rates would not be 
qualitatively different. Nor, for that matter, would be 
the scenario of Table 3 based on US treasury bond 
yields. In short, another seven million ounces would 
not have made a telling difference despite very high 
prices of gold.
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Box 2: What Is the SDR Interest Rate and What Difference Does It Make?
The SDR started life in 1969 bearing an interest rate of 1.5 percent, but in June 1974 the rate was increased 
to five percent. From July 1974, when the SDR valuation was changed from a gold value to a basket of 16 
currencies, the SDR yields were taken from five main international currencies, which were predicted to give a 
good approximation of the total weighted yields from short-term assets from all participating currencies (the 
SDR actually underperformed the full weighted average of the original 16 currencies’ yields). The SDR rate was 
set at 50 percent of a weighted average of market yields on US and UK treasury bills and three-month German 
and French interbank rates. The Japanese yen contribution was the rate on uncollateralized call money until May 
1, 1981 and thereafter that on two-month private bills. The heterogeneity of the basis of the yields — US and UK 
treasury bills versus private yields in the Deutschmark, French franc and Japanese yen — reflected differences 
in money market development that have persisted in one form or another to this day. When the French and 
Japanese treasuries began regular bill issuance, these joined the US and UK treasury bills in the setting of the 
SDR yield, but the Bundesbank’s opposition to floating rate government debt left the Deutschmark yield an 
interbank rate. From 1976, the factor was raised from 50 percent to 60 percent and then from the start of 1979 
to 80 percent and then from May 1, 1981 to 100 percent. These steps from half to full market yield were taken to 
make the SDR a more attractive reserve asset (IMF Annual Reports 1980 and 1981). The rates were set quarterly 
from 1976 (previously half-yearly).
The arrival of the euro, however, disturbed even this uneven mapping from currencies to governments. The 
three-month German interbank rate and the three-month French treasury bill rate continued to be used until 
the regular five-year review in 2000. Then, the basis of the SDR yield was changed from membership (i.e., France 
and Germany) to currency (i.e., the euro). In the absence of a euro-wide government bill, the euro’s yield was 
taken as three-month Euro Inter Bank Offered Rate (Euribor), that is, an unsecured interbank money market 
rate.*
The subsequent quinquennial review narrowed but did not eliminate the gap between the government bill rates 
for the dollar, sterling and yen and the private bank rate used for the euro. The European Central Bank proposed 
that a secured private sector rate, the three-month eurepo rate, would better approximate the (low) risk profile 
of a sovereign short-term debt instrument. As the IMF (2005: 16) reported: “The Eurepo was introduced in 2002 
as a reference rate for secured (collateralized) money market transactions. It is the rate at which one prime bank 
offers funds in euro to another prime bank if in exchange the former receives from the latter ‘Eurepo general 
collateral’ (GC) as collateral. The GC is widely accepted due to its homogeneous composition of government 
paper.”
Still, the eurepo rate has tended to be higher than the yields on the bills of the best-rated euro area sovereigns. 
For instance, in a recent calculation of the SDR rate from the IMF (Box Table), the euro interest rate from the 
European Banking Federation’s survey of three-month eurepo was 80.71 basis points, while the three-month 
German government (“Bubill”) and French government (“BTF”) bill rates were about 20 basis points lower at 
around 60 basis points.
*As reported by the IMF (2005: 17): “Staff considered alternatives to the use of the Euribor, since it is not a treasury-type financial instrument, 
but rather a reference rate for the banking sector. Possible alternatives explored were: (i) a weighted average of three-month treasury bill rates; 
(ii) a representative repo rate; (iii) a bid rate in the unsecured market; and (iv) the rate on the ECB three-month refinancing facility. The was 
ultimately chosen at the time of the 2000 review, since the alternatives compared unfavourably when benchmarked against the guidelines for 
the inclusion of interest rate instruments in the SDR interest rate basket. The main problems encountered with alternative instruments were 
highly segmented and largely domestically oriented markets, therefore reducing the representativeness of such instruments for the wider 
euro area, the fact that six countries in the euro area did not issue treasury bills, and the limited response to changes in underlying credit 
conditions. However, there remained misgivings by some directors concerning the risk characteristics of the Euribor.”
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Box Table: SDR Interest Rate for the Week of November 1–7, 2010 (as of Friday, October 29, 2010, in percent)
Currency Currency Amount
Exchange rate against 
the
SDR interest rate Product
Euro 0.4100 0.881609 0.8071 0.2917
Japanese Yen 18.4000 0.0078955 0.1100 0.0160
Pound Sterling 0.0903 1.01299 0.5100 0.0467
US Dollar 0.6320 0.636219 0.1200 0.0483
Total 0.4027
SDR Interest Rate 0.40
Source: IMF.
The implication of the use of a repo rate for the euro for the substitution account is that, since 1999, it is slightly 
less likely that the excess of US dollar interest rates over SDR yields offsets any depreciation of the dollar against 
the SDR. The box figure plots the three-month Eurepo against the three-month French and German government 
bills. While the gap in normal times is narrow, it can widen appreciably during periods in which private market 
participants flee to quality. Any such widening of European private sector yield spreads over government bill rates is 
permanently impounded in the SDR cumulative returns that matter for the solvency of the substitution account. The 
element of private risk in the SDR yield raises the hurdle for the account.
Box Figure: Three-month Rates for the Euro (on Government Bills and on Repos against Euro Area 
Government Bonds)
Box Graph  
Three-month Rates for the Euro 
On government bills and on repos against euro area government bonds 
 
Source: Bloomberg. 
 
	  
	   	  
Source: Bloomberg.
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CONCLUSIONS
The conceptual attractions of a substitution account 
to absorb unwanted US dollar reserves and increase 
the role of the SDR have attracted IMS reformers for 
over 30 years. In the 1970s, part of the appeal of such 
schemes was to develop a mechanism that might 
ultimately require the United States to redeem its 
liabilities in SDR, or at the very least would create an 
SDR-denominated reserve asset that could rival the 
dollar. Repeated efforts to design such an institution 
have stumbled over technical and political obstacles. 
Kenen (2010a) points to the refusal of the United 
States to bear the sole burden of losses as a key reason 
why the substitution account was not adopted, 
but it was how to cover any losses rather than an 
expectation that they would all be borne by the 
United States that was at issue. This posed important 
obstacles that proved insurmountable, including the 
use of gold reserves, the returns on the liabilities and 
assets of the account and the obligation of the United 
States ultimately to redeem its outstanding US dollar 
liabilities. In April 1980, the IMF predicted that a 
considerable amount of extra resources would be 
required from the outset to ensure that the account 
remained balanced. Moreover, we have argued that 
even if these issues had been resolved, and the IMF’s 
gold had been committed to the account, it would 
not have broken even with US treasury bill returns.
To have eroded the share of dollars in global reserves 
substantially, the substitution account would have 
to serve as a process for converting dollars into SDR 
rather than a one-shot deal. As it was conceived 
in 1980, the substitution account would have 
immobilized a substantial fraction of global reserves. 
In mid-1980, SDR 50 billion represented about 
16 percent of global foreign exchange reserves outside 
of those held by the United States and a third of US 
dollar reserves. On our baseline scenario, the initial 
SDR 50 billion would have grown fivefold. Yet by the 
end of 2010, this compounded sum would have fallen 
to less than five percent of global reserves (Figure 9). 
Thus, although the substitution account was aimed 
at resolving the “stock” problem of large existing 
balances of US dollar reserves, its benefit measured 
in stock terms would have eroded steadily over time. 
Thus, our hypothetical substitution account would 
have had to have been reopened in order to keep the 
presumed problem from reappearing. 
Figure 9: Share of Substitution Account Liabilities in Non-US Foreign Exchange Reserves, 1980–2010 (in percent, 
an initial SDR 50 billion, compounded at the SDR interest rate)
Figure 9 
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Conceiving of a substitution account instead as a 
perpetually open exit from US dollar reserves turns 
it from addressing a “stock” to a “flow” problem. This 
may have been (and be) what the proposers were 
(and are) really after, i.e., a way to turn the SDR 
into a more important reserve asset. Indeed, in the 
1980 proposal there was a provision to re-open 
the account once it had reached SDR 50 billion. 
However, it is hard to imagine the account being 
upsized unless it was at least in balance. As we have 
seen, this would have been rare in the case of the 
US Treasury paying interest at its bill rate. Moreover, 
additional “deposits” would have to have been well-
timed at or near US dollar troughs to maintain 
the performance of the account, as is clear in the 
comparison of starting it in 1980 or six months later. 
In our simulations, the substitution account fails a 
particular test of uncovered interest parity. As is well 
known, such tests depend for their results on the 
sample period chosen. However, since the dollar was 
near the bottom of its cycle in 1980, this seems a fair 
test.
The upshot is that those who suggest a substitution 
account again must deal with an inconvenient 
fact — the account would not have added up even 
with a substantial endowment of gold profits and a 
favourable start date unless the United States would 
have committed to pay a bond yield on the account’s 
assets. Indeed, given the preference on the part of 
modern reserve managers for bond investments, it is 
hard to imagine how negotiations for a substitution 
account would not focus on the US Treasury paying 
the two- to five-year note yields that correspond to 
the most usual official investment in US Treasury 
obligations today. How such negotiations would 
proceed, and what results might be obtained over 
time, with the Federal Reserve using large-scale 
bond purchases to lower the returns payable, are 
interesting questions. Choosing the right moment to 
open such an account and anticipating the possible 
rhythm of deficits as well as surpluses on its balance 
sheet would be significant challenges.
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ANNEX
Annex Table: Baseline Scenario — Start July 1980, Pay Dollar LIBOR Rate, 25 Million Ounces of Gold 
(in billions of SDRs)
End-
year
SDR 
yield*
3m USD 
LIBOR
Accumulated 
US$ assets
Accumulated 
SDR liabilities
US$/ 
SDR
Surplus or deficit
w/o gold
Gold 
price
w/ 25 m oz gold
In SDR
% of 
assets
In SDR
% of 
assets
1980 8.8 16.6 55.1 52.4 1.28 2.6 4.8 590 13.3 24.2
1981 14.7 14.5 71.6 58.9 1.16 12.7 17.7 400 20.4 28.5
1982 9.2 10.0 86.9 66.9 1.10 20.0 23.0 448 29.3 33.7
1983 8.9 9.9 100.8 73.2 1.05 27.7 27.4 382 35.9 35.6
1984 8.8 9.8 119.9 80.2 0.98 39.7 33.1 309 46.7 39.0
1985 7.8 8.2 116.7 87.1 1.10 29.7 25.4 327 36.2 31.0
1986 6.2 6.2 112.7 93.3 1.22 19.4 17.2 391 26.5 23.5
1987 6.1 8.0 103.9 99.1 1.42 4.8 4.6 487 12.5 12.0
1988 7.4 9.0 118.3 105.3 1.35 12.9 10.9 410 19.7 16.6
1989 9.1 8.6 132.9 114.2 1.31 18.7 14.1 401 25.4 19.2
1990 9.3 8.1 133.4 125.3 1.42 8.1 6.1 392 14.1 10.6
1991 7.6 5.0 141.8 136.2 1.43 5.7 4.0 353 11.0 7.7
1992 5.8 3.6 153.8 145.8 1.38 8.0 5.2 333 13.2 8.6
1993 4.2 3.4 159.2 153.5 1.37 5.8 3.6 391 12.0 7.5
1994 4.8 6.0 156.0 160.1 1.46 -4.0 -2.6 383 1.7 1.1
1995 4.3 5.9 162.8 167.9 1.49 -5.2 -3.2 387 0.5 0.3
1996 3.9 5.5 177.9 174.9 1.44 3.0 1.7 370 8.5 4.8
1997 4.4 5.8 200.5 182.1 1.35 18.4 9.2 289 22.9 11.4
1998 3.8 5.3 203.3 190.2 1.41 13.2 6.5 288 17.4 8.6
1999 3.8 6.1 219.7 197.0 1.37 22.7 10.3 291 27.1 12.3
2000 4.9 6.7 246.5 205.6 1.30 40.9 16.6 273 45.3 18.4
2001 2.4 2.1 268.4 214.2 1.26 54.2 20.2 277 58.9 21.9
2002 2.2 1.5 253.0 219.3 1.36 33.7 13.3 343 39.2 15.5
2003 1.6 1.2 234.5 223.3 1.49 11.2 4.8 417 17.3 7.4
2004 2.2 2.3 227.4 227.2 1.55 0.2 0.1 438 6.4 2.8
2005 3.0 4.3 254.7 232.8 1.43 21.9 8.6 513 30.0 11.8
2006 4.1 5.4 254.1 241.0 1.50 13.1 5.1 635 22.8 9.0
2007 3.7 5.0 255.2 251.4 1.58 3.8 1.5 836 16.1 6.3
2008 1.4 2.7 271.1 259.5 1.54 11.6 4.3 862 24.7 9.1
2009 0.3 0.3 269.8 261.3 1.57 8.5 3.1 1096 25.1 9.3
2010 0.4 0.3 275.6 262.0 1.54 13.6 4.9 1418 35.7 13.0
* Bond equivalent yield basis.
Sources: IMF; authors’ estimates.
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ABOUT ADB
ADB’s vision is an Asia and Pacific region free of poverty. Its mission is to help its developing member countries 
reduce poverty and improve the quality of life of their people. Despite the region’s many successes, it remains 
home to two-thirds of the world’s poor: 1.7 billion people who live on less than $2 a day, with 828 million 
struggling on less than $1.25 a day. ADB is committed to reducing poverty through inclusive economic growth, 
environmentally sustainable growth, and regional integration.
Based in Manila, ADB is owned by 67 members, including 48 from the region. Its main instruments for 
helping its developing member countries are policy dialogue, loans, equity investments, guarantees, grants, 
and technical assistance.
ABOUT HKIMR
Established by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority in August 1999, the Hong Kong Institute for Monetary 
Research (HKIMR) conducts research in the fields of monetary policy, banking and finance that are of strategic 
importance to Hong Kong, China and the Asia region. 
The Institute is funded by grants from the Exchange Fund, with its annual budget subject to the approval of 
the Exchange Fund Advisory Committee. The Institute’s objectives are to:
• Promote research on longer-term and wider policy issues/options of relevance to the monetary and 
financial development of Hong Kong, China and the Asia region.
• Foster cooperation and cross-fertilisation of research efforts between academics, analysts and the HKMA 
research activities, and to establish links and exchanges with research institutes in Hong Kong, China, the 
PRC and the regional economies.
• Facilitate central bank cooperation in research activities and contributing to policy analysis of strategic 
issues affecting monetary and financial developments in Asia.
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ABOUT CIGI
The Centre for International Governance Innovation is an 
independent, non-partisan think tank on international governance. 
Led by experienced practitioners and distinguished academics, 
CIGI supports research, forms networks, advances policy debate 
and generates ideas for multilateral governance improvements. 
Conducting an active agenda of research, events and publications, 
CIGI’s interdisciplinary work includes collaboration with policy, 
business and academic communities around the world.
CIGI’s current research programs focus on four themes: the global 
economy; global security; the environment and energy; and global 
development.
CIGI was founded in 2001 by Jim Balsillie, then co-CEO of Research 
In Motion (BlackBerry), and collaborates with and gratefully 
acknowledges support from a number of strategic partners, in 
particular the Government of Canada and the Government of Ontario.
Le CIGI a été fondé en 2001 par Jim Balsillie, qui était alors co-chef de 
la direction de Research In Motion (BlackBerry). Il collabore avec de 
nombreux partenaires stratégiques et exprime sa reconnaissance du 
soutien reçu de ceux-ci, notamment de l’appui reçu du gouvernement 
du Canada et de celui du gouvernement de l’Ontario.
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